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TARGETING ANWAR AL-AULAQI: A CASE STUDY IN 
U.S. DRONE STRIKES AND TARGETED KILLING
BENJAMIN R. FARLEY*
??????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
through a remote Yemeni governorate, killing Anwar al-Aulaqi.1  Al-Aulaqi—a Yemeni-American 
best known for his jihadist tracts delivered in colloquial American English—was reportedly added 
to U.S. targeted killing lists in early 2010 and was the target of  at least one earlier U.S. airstrike2  The 
killing of  al-Aulaqi has focused attention on the U.S. practice of  targeted killings.  It has also raised 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????3  When applicable, each of  these frameworks provides legal authority for a state 
to use force against an individual.4?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for—or a blanket prohibition against—targeted killings.  Instead, each framework provides authority 
for the use of  force, including targeted killings, when that framework’s particular requirements are 
??????????
Unlike most scholarship addressing targeted killings, this Article does not argue that targeted 
killings are generally lawful or generally unlawful.  Instead, this Article argues that, although both 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
other individuals on U.S. targeted killing list.  Nevertheless, this Article argues that al-Aulaqi was 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
* J.D., with honors, Emory University School of  Law (2011); M.A., The Elliott School of  International Affairs, The 
George Washington University (2007). The author would like to thank Professors Charles Shanor and Laurie R. Blank 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
Sterling.
?? ? ???? ??????????????????????????????????? ??????Two-year Manhunt Led to Killing of  Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2011, at A1. 
2  Id.
3  See, e.g., Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of  State, International Law and the Obama Administration, Keynote 
Address Before the American Society of  International Law (Mar. 25, 2010); Mem. in Supp. of  Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss at 
4-5, 8-9, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010).
4  For a discussion of  whether targeted killings should be governed by the law enforcement paradigm or the “war” 
paradigm in counterterrorism contexts, see CHARLES A. SHANOR, COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 642–74 (2011); see also
GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, AND TERRORISTS 69–91 (2010).
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
United States is intervening. 
To reach these conclusions, this Article analyzes the use of  force against Anwar al-Aulaqi under 
both frameworks.  Part I provides background information on Anwar al-Aulaqi, AQAP, and the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
both the United States and al-Aulaqi are participating, which would vest the United States with 
authority to kill al-Aulaqi.  Finally, Part III analyzes whether the United States is able to rely on self-
defense to justify its targeting of  al-Aulaqi.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Anwar al-Aulaqi
Anwar al-Aulaqi was an American-born Islamic cleric.5  Although he emerged as a voice of  mod-
erate Islam in the aftermath of  the 9/11 attacks,6 he has since been linked to the 9/11 hijackers,7 as 
well as to several recent attempted and consummated terrorist attacks against the United States by 
AQAP.8
Although the exact nature of  al-Aulaqi’s involvement with AQAP is unclear, he appears to have 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????-
ed, “[T]he best way to describe him is inspirational rather than operational.”9  More recently, though, 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????10  He was 
reportedly responsible for AQAP’s interest in attacking targets within the United States.11  He was 
???????????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
?? ??????? ?????? ???????????? ???????Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki puts ‘Everybody Draw Mohammed’ Cartoonist Molly Norris on 
Execution List, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 11, 2010.
6  Scott Shane, Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009 at A1 (“A month after the Sept. 11 
??????????????????????????? ?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????How
Dangerous is the Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki?, TIME, Jan. 13, 2010 (“Indeed, [al-Aulaqi] spoke out against radicals, prompting 
the New York Times in October 2001 to label him as one of  a ‘new generation of  Muslim leader capable of  merging 
East and West.’”).
7  Scott Shane, Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009 at A1 (“[Al Aqlaki’s] contacts with 
three of  the Sept. 11 hijackers . . . remain a perplexing mystery about the 2001 attacks . . . .”). 
8  Chris McGreal, ??????????????????? ?????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????, GUARDIAN (UK), Nov. 1, 
2010, at A4; Muslim Cleric Aulaqi had Lunch at Pentagon, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2010, at A11.
9  Ghosh, supra note 6.
10  Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of  Radical Muslim Cleric Ties to Domestic Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2010 at A12; Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA’s Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010 (“‘Over the past several years, [al-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
11  See, e.g., LYDIA KHALIL, The Next Base?: Concerns About Somalia and Yemen, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE
5 (2011) (attributing the increase in AQAP attacks targeting the West to al-Aulaqi’s role in the organization); Thomas 
Hegghammer, The Case for Chasing al-Awlaki, FOR. POL’Y, Nov. 24, 2010 (“[Al-Aulaqi] is arguably the single most 
important individual behind the group’s efforts to carry out operations in the West . . . .”). 
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to the U.S. homeland.”12
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
of  targets for kill or capture as of  January 2010.13  On April 6, 2010, Obama administration leaks 
revealed that al-Aulaqi had been placed on the CIA’s separate targeted killing list because he was 
“believed to have shifted from encouraging attacks to directly participating in them.”14  In July 2010, 
the U.S. Treasury Department formally designated al-Aulaqi a terrorist.15  On May 5, 2011, a U.S. air-
strike in Yemen targeted but narrowly missed al-Aulaqi.16  Finally, on September 30, 2011, a battery 
?? ? ??????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?17
B. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
In January 2009, al-Qaeda in Yemen and the remnants of  an al-Qaeda cell from Saudi Arabia 
merged to form AQAP.18  Both of  these local cells were formed following the so-called “Yemeni 
Great Escape of  2006.”  On February 3, 2006, twenty-three inmates escaped from Yemen’s Political 
Security Organization (PSO) headquarters in Sana’a by tunneling 460 feet from their basement cell 
to a neighboring mosque.19  Two of  these escapees emerged as the leaders of  al-Qaeda in the South-
ern Arabian Peninsula, or al-Qaeda in Yemen.20
As an organization, AQAP is distinct from al-Qaeda proper.21  An emir, currently Nasir al-Wa-
hayshi, heads the group. AQAP maintains its own propaganda arm, which produces a bimonthly 
magazine entitled Salah al-Malahim.  It has earned a place unto itself  on the United States’ list of  
12  Josh Gerstein, ??????????????????????????????????, POLITICO, Feb. 9, 2011, (quoting former National 
???????????????????????? ???????? ???????????????? ??????????????????????????????Awlaki: ‘The Most Dangerous 
Man in the World,’ ABC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/awlaki-dangerous-man-world/
story?id=12109217. 
13  Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in aiding Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A01. 
14  Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of  American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010 (citing unnamed U.S. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????ee also Memo. in Supp. of  Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 
No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010); James Clapper, Decl. in Supp. of  Formal Claim of  State Secrets Privilege, at ¶¶ 13-
15, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010).
15  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of  the Treasury, Treasury Designates Anwar Al-Aulaqi Key Leader of  Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (July 16, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg779.aspx. 
16  US Drone Attack in Yemen ‘Missed’ al-Awlaki, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (May 7, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2011/05/2011572342146775.html.
17  See Mazzetti, supra note 1.
18  JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL
PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 14 (2011).  AQAP should not be confused with the Al Qaeda cell operating 
in Yemen at the time of  the U.S.S. Cole bombing.  That attack occurred in 2000, nine years before AQAP’s formation.  
Id. at 8. 
19  Christine Hauser, Mastermind of  U.S.S. Cole Attack Escapes Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006.
20  Id.
??? ? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????????????????,
NP????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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designated terrorist organizations.22  It has also been described as having “eclipsed [al-Qaeda] central 
as the primary threat to U.S. national security.”23  AQAP’s goals, though, are similar in scale to those 
of  al-Qaeda.  AQAP seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate and also attempts to launch attacks on a 
regional and global scale.  Since its founding, AQAP has launched attacks targeting both the Yemeni 
and Saudi states.24  AQAP and its pre-merger Yemen predecessor have also targeted Western diplo-
mats and installations in Yemen.25
C. Targeted Killings 
A targeted killing is the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of  lethal force by [a] State[] 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tody of  the [State employing the targeted killing].”26  A handful of  states have embraced targeted 
killings and have employed the killings in a variety of  contexts, including international armed con-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
killings—particularly Israel’s use of  targeted killings27—since September 11, 2001, the United States 
has vigorously embraced the tactic.28
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????????
in Yemen.29  Since that strike, the United States has engaged in targeted killing in Yemen, Somalia,30
and Pakistan.  In Pakistan, U.S. drone strikes, some of  which are presumably part of  the U.S. tar-
geted killing program, have increased from just nine strikes between 2004 and 2007, to thirty-four 
?? ? ??????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????????? ??????????????available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
23 Christopher Boucek, The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Yemen, CTC SENTINEL, Sept. 1 2010, at 5. 
24 Scott Stewart, AQAP: Paradigm Shifts and Lessons Learned, STRATFOR, Sept. 2, 2009; James Gallagher, AQAP and 
Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010, AEI: CRITICAL THREATS (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.criticalthreats.org/
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
25 See, e.g., Rollins, supra note 18, at 17 (describing pre-merger militants’ attacks on western embassies in Sana’a, 
foreign oil companies and their facilities, and tourists, and assassination attempts on foreigners, including the British 
Ambassador and Embassy workers).  
26 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); see also KENNETH ANDERSON, TARGETED KILLING IN U.S. 
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND LAW???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
killed”).
27  Joel Greenberg, ??????? ??????????????? ? ????????????? ????????, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A5 (“‘The United States 
government is very clearly on the record as against targeted assassinations,’ [American Amb. to Israel Martin Indyk] said. 
‘They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.’”). 
28 See, e.g.??????????????????????????????????????Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of  the U.S. Drone Program in 
Pakistan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Aug. 2011, at 12–18 (describing the Bush and Obama administrations’ increasing use of  
drone attacks); PETER BERGEN & KATHERINE TIEDEMANN, THE YEAR OF THE DRONE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. DRONE STRIKES
IN PAKISTAN, 2004-2010 1 (2010).
29  Norman G. Printer, The Use of  Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An Analysis of  the U.S. Predator 
Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 332 (2003).
30  Karen DeYoung, U.S. Says Raid in Somalia Killed Terrorist With Links to Al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009, at A9.
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?????????????????????????????????????????????31  While the frequency of  drone strikes in Pakistan is 
unparalleled, the United States has deployed drones to Yemen,32 threatening to emulate its Pakistan 
campaign there.33
The United States maintains at least two targeted killing lists.34?????????????????????????????????????
on either list are not publically known.  However, reports indicate that the inclusion of  a target on 
the CIA’s list is contingent on the target being “‘deemed . . . a continuing threat to U.S. persons or 
interests.’”35  According to reports, counterterrorism analysts nominate individuals for addition via 
memoranda, in which the analysts make the case for inclusion.36 Such reports also indicate that, once 
targeted, an individual is continuously eligible for killing.37
II. CAN THE UNITED STATES RELY ON AN ARMED CONFLICT TO JUSTIFY ITS TARGETING OF ANWAR AL-
AULAQI?
The United States claims that its targeting of  Anwar al-Aulaqi was lawful because of  his partici-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
??????????????????????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
less restrictive provisions of  Common Article 3 and the customary international law governing non-
??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
31  Year of  the Drone: An Analysis of  U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2011, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (last visited May 17, 2011).
??? ? ?????????????????? ????????U.S. Drones on Hunt in Pakistan, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2010, at A1. 
??? ??????????????????????? ???????U.S. Weighs Expanded Drone Strikes in Yemen, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, at A1.
34  See Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of  Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to Domestic Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 2010, at 12; Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA’s Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010 (describing the lists maintained 
by JSCO and the CIA).  Inclusion on one list does not necessarily indicate inclusion on the other list.  For example, al-
Aulaqi was added to the U.S. military’s targeted kill list at least by the end of  January 2010; at that point, al-Aulaqi had 
not yet been added to the CIA’s targeted kill list.
35  Miller, supra note 34.
36  Id.
37  Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/
inside-the-killing-machine.html.  McKelvey quotes former Acting General Counsel for the CIA, John A. Rizzo, as saying, 
“‘It’s [the list of  targets] basically a hit list.’”  Id.  The program Rizzo describes is one in which CIA staffers produce 
memoranda justifying the targeting of  particular individuals.  The CIA General Counsel then approves those individuals 
for targeting.  At that point, the target joins a group of  “‘individuals [the United States is] searching for [that the United 
States has determined] it is better now to neutralize the threat [those individuals pose].’”  Id.  It is this process—the 
nomination for targeting followed by the search for that target—that suggests targeted individuals become continuously 
subject to lethal force.  Id.
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?????????????????????????38
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????-
tarian law for authority to kill Anwar al-Aulaqi is to determine whether both the United States and 
????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
???? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????39  Common Article 2 of  the Geneva Conventions pro-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????
which may arise between two or more of  the High Contracting Parties, even if  the state of  war is 
not recognized by one of  them.”40  Common Article 3 sets forth minimum provisions applicable “in 
??????????? ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????
High Contracting Parties . . . .”41
????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
the Appeals Chamber of  the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tween States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”42  The Tadic????????????????????????????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”  
According to the authoritative Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, “[a]ny difference arising 
between two States and leading to the intervention of  members of  the armed forces is an armed 
??????????????????? ????????? ??????????????????? ??????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????
38 OSCAR M. UHLER & HENRI COURSIER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter GC IV 
C??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
wounded and sick military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little to other categories of  war victims, in logical 
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
the extension of  legal protection in turn to prisoners of  war and civilians.  The same logical process could not fail to 
lead to the idea of  applying the principle in all????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39 Id.
40  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
art. 2, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
41 Id. at art. 3
?? ??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
¶ 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)).
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of  war.”43  The duration of  the hostilities or the number of  wounded or killed does not impact the 
??????????????????? ????????????????
Although foreign armed forces have intervened in Yemen, nothing indicates that these interven-
tions have been driven by “difference[s] arising between” those states.  The hostilities that are taking 
place in Yemen are not taking place between Yemen and another state—the government of  Yemen 
has consented to the U.S. presence in Yemen and has collaberated on U.S. operations there.  Thus, it 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
??????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????Tadic Trial Chamber 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
?????????44  These two factors “are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of  distinguishing an 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are not subject to international humanitarian law.”45
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ???????????
those associated with banditry or mere internal disturbances.  To determine whether hostilities 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
duration and intensity of  individual confrontations; the frequency of  clashes; the duration of  the 
????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
armed forces against the non-state actor; the geographic and temporal distribution of  the clashes; 
and the number of  casualties.46
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????47  Factors considered in examining the 
??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
the group’s hierarchal structure; its control and administration of  territory; its ability to recruit and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or peace agreements.48
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
43  GC IV Commentary, supra note 38, at 20.
44  ?????, IT-94-1-T ¶ 562.
45  ?????, IT-94-1-T ¶ 562 (referencing INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA (Pictet ed., 
1952)).
46  Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 49,60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 
3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 
2005); ?????, IT-94-1-T, at ¶¶ 564-6.
47  Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 89. 
48  Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T, at ¶ 60; Prosecutor v. Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 884 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009).
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ??? ???????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion of  the hostilities taking place between AQAP and Yemen to determine whether they rise to the 
???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the context of  Yemen-AQAP hostilities to determine if  they constitute a foreign-armed interven-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explored to determine whether that relationship impacts the characterization of  hostilities between 
the United States and AQAP.   
??????? ??????????????????????????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ?????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
hostilities between Yemen and AQAP surpass the level of  violence associated with banditry or riots, 
?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
a. Organizational Capacity of  AQAP
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
of  organization need not rise to the level required to establish command responsibility.49  Rather, the 
????????? ??????????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from a mob engaged in a riot.50  Factors to support the necessary level of  organization include pos-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
??????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Hierarchy
AQAP does not possess the rigid hierarchy generally associated with regular armed forces.  
Instead, it mimics the al-Qaeda model of  “‘centralization of  decisions and decentralization of  
49  Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 90. 
50  Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF 
WAR A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 16-17 (2009); see also Richard A. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of  
Internal War, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 197–99 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1964).
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execution.’”51  Importantly, this structure is not indicative of  organizational failings on the part of  
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????52  Thus, Na-
hir al-Wihayshi, emir of  AQAP, is responsible for approving all AQAP suicide strikes in Yemen and 
attacks abroad—with input from a senior council of  advisers53—but AQAP’s various operational 
units are “an alliance of  components,”54 drawn together through either tribal or ideological linkag-
es.55  This structure is designed to lend the group robustness so that it might survive a decapitation 
strike in contrast to the al-Qaeda cell that operated in Yemen immediately following the 9/11 at-
tacks.56
The operational decentralization of  AQAP makes its structure analogous to the structure em-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????57  Like AQAP, the KLA possessed a central command 
but delegated operational responsibility to local commanders responsible for fairly large portions of  
territory.58  In fact, the KLA arguably delegated more operational responsibility to local command-
ers than does AQAP.  Whereas al-Wihayshi reportedly personally approves AQAP operations, local 
KLA commanders were merely obligated “to inform the General Staff  about all developments in 
their respective areas of  responsibility.”59
In its analysis, the ICTY also emphasized the increasing organizational strength of  the KLA 
over time.60  Similarly, over the last four years, AQAP has “transformed itself  from a fractured and 
fragmented group of  individuals into an organization that is intent on launching attacks through-
out the Arabian Peninsula.”61  At the same time, AQAP attacks within Yemen have been “strik-
51  Gregory D. Johnsen, The Impact of  Bin Laden’s Death on AQAP in Yemen, CTC SENTINEL May 2011, at 9.
52  Cf. Limaj?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
KLA was effectively an underground organisation [sic], operating in conditions of  secrecy out of  concern to preserve its 
leadership, and under constant threat of  military action by the Serbian forces.”).
53  Johnsen, supra note 51, at 9. 
54  Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM, Mar. 22, 2011, at 15.
55  See id. ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????see also Ryan Evans, From 
Iraq to Yemen: Al-Qa’ida’s Shifting Strategies, CTC SENTINEL, Oct. 2010, at 11, 13–14 (asserting that AQAP has consolidated 
tribal support in some regions by adopting local grievances against the Yemeni government).
56  See Johnsen, supra note 51, at 9 (providing a brief  description of  the United States attacks against Al-Qaeda in 
Yemen in the months after 9/11); see also Gregory D. Johnsen, The Expansion Strategy of  Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,
CTC SENTINEL, Jan. 2010, at 4, 6 (“[A]l-Qa’ida [in the Arabian Peninsula] has been working single-mindedly to create a 
durable infrastructure that can withstand the loss of  key leaders and cells.”).
57  Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 134..
58  Cf. id. at ¶ 95 (“[T]he territory of  Kosovo was divided by the KLA into seven zones . . . . Each zone had a 
commander and covered the territory of  several municipalities. The level of  organisation [sic] and development in each 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
59  See id. at ¶¶ 97–98 (noting that KLA commanders generally—but not absolutely—complied with directions from 
the KLA’s General Staff).
60  See id. at ¶ 129 (referring to the increased political power of  the KLA in Kosovo).
61  Johnsen, The Expansion Strategy, supra note 56, at 4.
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ingly consistent”62 with the group’s stated objectives: targeting foreigners, the Yemeni state, and oil 
infrastructure while avoiding Yemeni civilians63 and exhibiting strong operational coordination and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????64
Indeed, AQAP may well have evolved from primarily a terrorist organization to “an insurgent group 
willing to wage guerrilla war and contest control of  portions of  the Yemeni hinterland with the 
Yemeni government.”65  Though the ability to contest control of  Yemeni territory does not rise to 
the KLA’s ability to exert administrative control over portions of  Kosovo,66 it certainly distinguishes 
AQAP from a riotous mob.
Also like the KLA, AQAP maintains a propaganda and public relations operation.67  Upon its 
formation, AQAP released a statement describing its goals, objectives, and leadership structure.68
Since then, it has operated both Arabic-language and English-language publications, including both 
Sada al-Malahim and Inspire, which extol the group’s operations and seek to inspire potential recruits 
to join AQAP. Additionally, AQAP consciously and, according to one observer, “shrewd[ly],”69 em-
ploys “soft power” to strengthen its position in Yemen while avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????70
Recruiting Fighters
In determining that the KLA had the necessary degree of  organization to be a party to a non-in-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
join the organisation [sic].”71????????????? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
its cause.  It publishes Arabic-language and English-language magazines online to reach out to local 
????????????????????72  As such, and due in part to its media-wing’s ability to capitalize on a botched 
62  Boucek, supra note 23, at 5–6.
63  See JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 54; Evans, supra note 55, at 13–14; Boucek, supra note 23, at 5–6; W. 
ANDREW TERRILL, THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 55 (2011).
64  See Limaj???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
in developing greater coordination and consistency between the KLA and the units).
65  W. ANDREW TERRILL, THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 62–63 (2011) (discussing AQAP forces’ 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
66  See generally, Limaj, IT-03-66-T (discussing how the General Staff  of  the KLA maintained control of  occupied 
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
recedes, AQAP reportedly polices the territory that it has taken and held.
67  See, e.g., Boucek, supra note 23, at 6 (describing AQAP’s media strategy as “highly sophisticated”). 
68  See JANE’S WORLD INSURGENCY, supra note 54. 
??? ?????????????AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen, CTC SENTINEL, Nov. 2010, at 1.
70  See id. at 1–5 (discussing how AQAP has used a more practical approach in dealing with disputes local tribes rather 
than the typical hard-line approach); TERRILL, supra note 63 (noting that much of  the Yemeni population do not view al-
Qaeda as a serious threat because they do not target Yemeni civilians).
71  Limaj, IT-03-66-T, at ¶ 118.
72  See, e.g., Chris Harnisch, The Continued al Qaeda Threat from Yemen, DAILY CALLER (Nov. 1, 2010), http://dailycaller.
com/2010/11/01/the-continued-al-qaeda-threat-from-yemen/ (noting that Al-Qaeda has released two issues of  an 
English language magazine, “Inspire”).
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U.S. airstrike, AQAP is stronger today than it was in December 2009.73  AQAP has also bolstered its 
ranks by co-opting local Yemeni concerns and through strategic intermarriage with various Yemeni 
tribes.  In particular, AQAP has concentrated on recruiting secessionist-minded southern Yemenis, 
disaffected by the Saleh regime.74  These strategies have allowed AQAP to grow from a few dozen 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????75
AQAP’s strategy of  attacking Yemeni government targets that collocated in the region of  Yemen 
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????76
AQAP attacks have incited a heavy-handed and coarse Yemeni government response, which in turn 
enrages local civilians who already oppose the Yemeni state, encouraging them to join AQAP.77
Employing Attacks Using Military Tactics
Beginning in late 2009, AQAP began a gradually intensifying campaign targeting the state of  
Yemen. AQAP now regularly attacks targets associated with the state of  Yemen.78  While some of  
???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????79 most employ common 
military tactics like ambushes using small arms, mortars, and rocket propelled grenades.  AQAP tar-
gets convoys of  Yemeni troops, military installations, as well as infrastructure.  For example, on May 
??????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
soldiers;80 on April 26, 2011, AQAP militants ambushed a Yemeni Republican Guard convoy, killing 
eight Republican Guard soldiers;81 and on March 26, 2011, AQAP militants sacked a weapons fac-
tory and seized control of  two towns, a presidential palace, and a radio station.82  Importantly, these 
attacks have not just been harassment operations but have resulted in AQAP control of  Yemeni 
towns and, in some cases, whole districts—in fact, on March 31, 2011, AQAP seized control of  
73  See Johnsen, The Impact of  Bin Laden’s Death, supra note 51, at 9 (explaining how al-Qaeda used a botched bombing 
raid in the southern Yemeni village of  al-Majalla to bolster support).
74  See Ronan McGee, Why Awlaki Should Not be the Focus of  Concern in Yemen, INT’L AFFAIRS REV. (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/165 (“AQAP has been attempting to recruit southerners disenchanted with the grim 
economic and political conditions—conditions caused largely by the government’s policies.”).
75  See Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at 
A01.
76  TERRILL, supra note 63, at 59–60. 
77  Id. at 61.
78  Id. at 62-65. See also AQAP and Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010 and 2011, AEI CRITICAL THREATS,
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010 (providing information 
on al Qaeda’s continued insurgency in Yemen and attacks for which AQAP has taken credit and incidents attributed to 
AQAP by the government).
79  For example, on June 19, 2009, four AQAP militants, dressed as women, attacked the Yemeni intelligence 
headquarters in Aden. ???? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ???? ??, AEI CRITICAL
THREATS??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
80  See id.
81  See id.
82  See id.
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Abyan governorate and declared it an Islamic emirate.83
AQAP’s tactics—targeting police and security forces, laying ambushes, and making use of  small 
????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
indicia of  organizational strength in the Limaj case.84  Also like the KLA, AQAP conducts opera-
tions over a wide swath of  territory.  AQAP attacks have occurred in nine of  Yemen’s twenty-one 
governorates85 —governorates that cover some 366,269 square kilometers—an area about 30 times 
as large as the KLA’s total operating area.  The ability of  AQAP to consistently launch attacks over 
such a large amount of  territory is another indication of  its organizational capacity.86
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????87
b. Intensity of  Hostilities between Yemen and AQAP 
Several factors when combined strongly suggest that the hostilities between Yemen and AQAP 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
and the rate of  hostilities between the Yemeni government and AQAP militants, as well as the dura-
??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????-
vidual confrontations have been both sustained and sudden.  For example, on June 12, 2010, AQAP 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????88  Such drive-by 
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????89  Other clashes, though, have 
involved large-scale Yemeni military operations, sieges of  towns held by AQAP, and the displace-
83  Yemen: Al Qaeda Declares South Province as “Islamic Emirate,” EURASIA REVIEW (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.
eurasiareview.com/yemen-al-qaeda-declares-south-province-as-islamic-emirate-31032011/. 
84  See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 
30, 2005).
85  See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra note 79 (indicating AQAP attacks have taken place in Abyan, Adan, Bayda, 
Hadramaut, Jawf, Lahij, Ma’rib, Sana’a, and Shabwah governorates).  
86  Cf. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 
30, 2005).
87  Cf. id. at ¶ 171. 
88  See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which militants have attempted drive-by assassinations).
89  See id.
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ment of  thousands of  civilians.90??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
in September 2010 displaced at least 15,000 civilians.91
The rate of  hostilities between the Yemeni government and AQAP militants has increased 
steadily between 2009 and 2011.  While there were only a handful of  clashes between Yemen and 
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????????-
ed clashes in the second half  of  2010, and there have been nearly sixty in 2011.92  In these attacks, 
AQAP has demonstrated “operational boldness and sophistication.”93  The Yemeni government has 
“declared war on AQAP” 94 and attempted to recapture towns and other territory from AQAP.95  In 
its attempts to oust AQAP, Yemen has deployed its regular armed forces alongside its civilian secu-
rity forces.96???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
tanks, artillery, and the Yemeni air force.97
The increase in the hostilities between AQAP and the Yemeni government, the frequency with 
which they occur,98 the government’s use of  its regular armed forces, and the government’s “declara-
tion of  war” all indicate that the government of  Yemen and AQAP are engaged in a non-interna-
?????????????????????
90  See, e.g., Al-Qaeda Fighters Seize Yemeni City, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, (May 29, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/
middleeast/2011/05/201152815531552947.html (describing clashes that displaced “thousands” of  civilians); Nasser 
Arrabyee, Four al-Qaeda Fighters Killed as Army Starts All-Out Attack in Al Huta, YEMEN OBSERVER (Sept. 25, 2010), http://
www.yobserver.com/front-page/10019720.html (detailing an attack outside the town of  Al Huta that prompted 300 
????????????????????????????????supra note 23, at 5-7 (describing the Yemeni government’s use of  “large-scale” offensives 
against suspected AQAP operatives).
91  INT’L CRISIS GROUP, CRISIS WATCH NO. 86, Oct. 1, 2010, at 11.
92  See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra note 79 (detailing seventy-seven AQAP attacks between June 7, 2010 and Dec. 25, 
2010, and sixty attacks between Jan. 1, 2011 and Oct. 11, 2011).
93  Fawaz A. Gerges, Yemen’s Summer of  Discontent, THE MAJALLA (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.majalla.com/
eng/2010/08/article55113178.
94  Yemen Declares War on AQAP, UPI.COM (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/01/07/
Yemen-declares-war-on-AQAP/UPI-16041262890800/. 
95  See ??????????????????????????? ??????Yemen’s Drive on Al Qaeda Faces Internal Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the past year, with far more military raids and airstrikes, including some carried out by the American military. His 
government has paid a price. On Saturday, a day after the discovery of  the air freight bomb plot, Mr. Saleh said during a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over previous years, and some analysts have taken it as proof  that al-Qaeda’s Yemen-based branch is growing.”).
96  Id.
97  See, e.g., Jeffery Fleishman, Yemen Pursues Al Qaeda Munitions Expert Linked to Package Bomb Plot, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2010, at A3 (describing Yemeni Special Forces’ search for a Saudi-born bomb maker implicated in a threat to United 
States-bound planes); Laura Kasinof, Yemen’s Delicate Dance Between US Pressure, Al Qaeda Threat, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 2, 2010 (describing Yemen’s use of  military jets and air strikes); Laura Kasinof, Yemen Goes On Offensive Against Al 
Qaeda, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sep. 22, 2010 (describing Yemen’s use of  tanks against AQAP).
98  See AEI CRITICAL THREATS, supra note 79. 
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??? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????99 the intensity of  the 
hostilities between the United States and AQAP likely do not rise to the level necessary for an armed 
?????????
In examining the intensity of  hostilities, international humanitarian law seeks to separate the 
??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
analysis examines the seriousness of  the hostilities, considering such factors as the number, the dura-
tion, and the intensity of  individual confrontations; the types of  weapons employed; the number of  
persons and the types of  forces engaged in clashes; the territory that has been captured and held; the 
????????? ?????????????????????????? ? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
the frequency of  hostilities.100
While U.S. strikes against AQAP targets have involved the deployment of  regular armed forces 
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
quent and sporadic, not sustained and prolonged.  Similarly, AQAP has only infrequently attacked—
or attempted to attack—the United States. Since 2009, the United States has reportedly conducted 
just a handful of  airstrikes in Yemen.101  During the same period, only three reported AQAP-linked 
operations have directly targeted areas within the United States.102  AQAP has not captured any ter-
ritory possessed by the United States, and the United States has not reportedly ousted AQAP from 
any territory it has captured in Yemen.  Finally, there have been no reports of  civilians in either the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
United States and disparate attempted terrorist attacks by AQAP do not rise to the level of  intense 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
99 See supra Part II.A.1.a (asserting that AQAP is sophisticated enough to constitute a party to a “non-international 
????????????????
100 See gen. Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T at ¶¶ 49,60; Limaj, IT-03-66-T at ¶ 90; Tadić, IT-94-1-T, at ¶¶ 564-6.
101 See ????????????? ???? ???????????????????? ??????A Secret Assault on Terror Widens on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2010 (describing a May 25, 2010 airstrike in Yemen as the fourth U.S. airstrike in Yemen since December 17, 
2009).
102 See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, REPORT ON AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, available at http://www.
nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last accessed Nov. 19, 2011).
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
United States operations in Yemen, including airstrikes targeting AQAP on behalf  of  the Ye-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????103 affecting the scope of  the applicable interna-
tional humanitarian law.104?? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
intervention will have one of  two possible effects.  Armed intervention in support of  a non-state 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????105  For example, many view the U.S. inva-
sion of  Afghanistan in the aftermath of  the September 11th attacks as an intervention of  a third 
state on behalf  of  a non-state actor.  The Northern Alliance, a non-state actor, had been engaged in 
a civil war against the Taliban regime of  Afghanistan since the mid-1990s.106  Once the United States 
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
United States and Afghanistan—were engaged in hostilities with each other.107
Alternatively, armed intervention in support of  a state government against a non-state actor puts 
103 See generally ANTONIO TANCA, FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICT 17–25 (1993) (discussing the 
??????? ????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
104 See, e.g, Anwar T. Frangi, ?????????????????????? ???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (1993) (distinguishing four different types of  internationalized 
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????? ? ?????????????, in
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 52–53 (1971) (explaining 
the difference between foreign intervention on behalf  of  a sovereign state and foreign intervention on behalf  of  
insurgents).
105 Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 104, at 52, 85–87; Dietrich Schindler, International Humanitarian Law and 
??????????????????????????? ?????????????, 64 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 255, 258–60 (1982); see also??????????????????????????? ???
IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 
(June 27).
106  Although the Taliban government of  Afghanistan was only recognized by three states, it was, at least, the de facto
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
indicates that the United States accepted that the Taliban government was the government of  Afghanistan.  Geoffrey S. 
Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 
(Michael Lewis et al. eds., 2009).
107  See id. ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 14 (2004).
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????108  Thus, follow-
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
United States intervening on behalf  of  the Karzai government.109
This was also true in 1979 when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan on behalf  of  
the government of  Afghanistan against the mujahideen.  The Soviet Union became entrenched in a 
?????????????????????????????????????????mujahideen.110?? ???????????????????????????????????????
circumstances,111 the Soviet intervention was clearly in opposition to the mujahideen and in defense of  
the Soviet-style government then in place in Afghanistan, even if  the Soviet Union had orchestrated 
a change in that government’s leadership.  Thus, the Soviet intervention is most often viewed as an 
intervention on behalf  of  a government against the non-state actor challenging it, placing the USSR 
??????????????????????????????????????????????mujahideen.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
states intervene is—and has long been—disputed,112 it is the majority view and the one endorsed by 
International Committee for the Red Cross and, implicitly, by the International Court of  Justice.  In-
deed, in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ separately 
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????contras??????????????????????????????????
between Nicaragua and the United States:
????????????????????????contras’ forces and those of  the government of  Nicaragua was an 
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????contras towards the Nicaraguan 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
the actions of  the United States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to interna-
????????????????113
As was the case with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, U.S. operations in Yemen target 
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ment of  the territorial state.  Though the scale of  the U.S. intervention in Yemen is markedly differ-
ent than the scale of  the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, this difference in degree is irrelevant.  
108  See Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 104, at 52; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE
7 (2005); Jelena Pejic, ????????? ? ?????????????, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW??????????????? ?? ?????????????????????????????????
109  See, e.g.????????????????????????????????????????Characterizing US Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States Engaged 
?????? ?????????????, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151, 178-184 (2011); Geoffrey S. Corn, ????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????????, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 181, 
181–82 (2009); Hans-Peter Gasser, ?????????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????
and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 150–52 (1983).
110  See Gasser, supra note 109, at 148–52.
111 See TANCA, supra note 103, at 176–77 (1993); see also Gasser, supra note 109, at 148–52. But see? ?????????????????
James Silk, ?????????? ?????????????? ?????????????, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 459, 466–74 (1988).
112  For example, Bindschedler-Robert notes that “[t]his distinction between the international and internal aspects 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 108, at 53.
113  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27).
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Instead, the relevant considerations here are whether Yemen is engaged in a non-international armed 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????114  If  the 
relationship between al-Qaeda and AQAP can be characterized as co-belligerency, then hostilities 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????115???????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????116
States may achieve co-belligerency through formal processes such as treaties of  alliance.117  A state 
may also become a co-belligerent through an informal process of  “provid[ing] help and succor only 
in a limited way to a principal belligerent”118 or by “mak[ing] common cause” with a belligerent.119
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????120 However, Bradley and Gold-
smith have suggested that the Authorization for the Use of  Military Force should be interpreted in 
light of  the customary principles of  co-belligerency.121  That is, they suggest grafting the concept 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
rejected in obiter dicta by a recent panel decision from the Court of  Appeals for the District of  Co-
114  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–632 (2006).
115 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 693-695 (1968); L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 
(1935); see also HENRY HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND
WAR 3 (1908).
116 See, e.g., HALLECK, supra, note 115, at 3, (“We have the same rights of  war against co-allies or associates as against 
the principal belligerent.”). 
117 Cf. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE 206 n.3 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., Longmans, 5th ed. 1935) 
(1905) (asserting that co-belligerents are not necessarily allies and that they can be associated for the sole purpose of  war 
even if  actions have yet to arise or there is no agreement as to when the war will be terminated). 
118  2 id. (examining minimal ways in which a state can act as an associate to a principal belligerent).
119 See HENRY HALLECK, SIR G. SHERSTON BAKER & MAURICE DRUCQUER, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR RULES REGULATING
THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 11-12 (4th ed. 1908) (citing Vattel); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 137-143 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) (abjuring the formalized 
relationship between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in favor of  an examination of  the actual interactions between the 
armed forces of  the two states to determine whether they were co-belligerents).
120 Cf. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 117, at 203 (“According to the Law of  Nations, full sovereign States alone possess the 
????????????????????????????????????????????
121 See????????????????????????????? ??????????Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2047, 2113 (2005) (suggesting that the laws of  war would deem “neutrals” assisting terrorist organizations and 
systematically violating the law of  neutrality as co-belligerents analogous to a traditional war). 
74 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 1
lumbia Circuit.122  Moreover, it has yet to gain much traction among international law scholars.123
Yet, there may be good reason to extend the concept of  co-belligerency to non-international 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????124  A state that intervenes 
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with that state.125  Moreover, two states supporting opposing non-state actors engaged in a non-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
in hostilities against each other.  However, similar intervention or support by one non-state group on 
?????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????
???????????????? ? ????????????????????126
?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
would not be as radical a shift as the D.C. Circuit intimates.  Oppenheim’s restriction of  co-belliger-
ency—really, belligerency—to States was not made in contradistinction to non-states but instead to 
“half  and part sovereign States.”127  Oppenheim even recognized that those “half  and part” states, 
??????????????????????????de jure belligerents, could become belligerents in fact.128 It follows logi-
122  Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). (“[E]ven if  Al-Bihani’s argument were relevant to his 
detention and putting aside all the questions that applying such elaborate rules to this situation would raise, the laws of  
co-belligerency affording notice of  war and the choice to remain neutral have only applied to nation states. The 55th 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?
the Taliban. Any attempt to apply the rules of  co-belligerency to such a force would be folly, akin to this court ascribing 
powers of  national sovereignty to a local chapter of  the Freemasons.”).
123  But see David Mortlock, ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????, 4 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 375, 395 (2010) (condoning the United States’ targeting of  organizations that have an actual relationship 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
belligerants).
124  4 JELENA PEJIC, ????????? ? ?????????????, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW??????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????????????????
125  Id.; see also Sylvain Vite, ??????????? ? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??????
Situations, 91 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 85-87 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
non state actor and the government is favored by the International Court of  Justice). 
126  See, e.g., M. Cheriff  Bassiouni, Legal Control of  International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Approach, 43 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 83, 88 (2002) (recognizing the globalization of  terrorist groups through increased communication, technology, 
and networking, which in turn maximizes their effectiveness in organized crime); see generally Jennifer Giroux, David 
??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
African Republic (Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper No. 47, 2009), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Publications/wpPhase2/wp47.aspx (recognizing the need for a new 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
ethnic groups).
127  2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 117, at 203-04. 
128  See 2 id. (acknowledging that half  and part sovereign states could in fact become belligerents when they possess 
armed forces and enter war).
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cally, then, that “half  and part” states could become co-belligerents in fact. 
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
common cause with al-Qaeda—they have overlapping if  not identical goals.  There is evidence that 
individuals who have fought with al-Qaeda have subsequently fought with the AQAP and there is 
evidence that they share information, and expertise.  These are indicators of  the organizations pro-
viding each other what Oppenheim calls “help and succor,” similar in kind, if  not degree, to a state 
paying subsidies or sending a certain number of  troops to a principal belligerent.129
B. Targeting Anwar al-Aulaqi
???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????-
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????130 of  international humanitarian 
law governing the laws and customs of  law demands that states use weapons that distinguish be-
tween combatants and civilians.131  Combatants may be targeted at any time and in any place, so long 
as they have not been rendered hors de combat “by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.”132
Civilians, on the other hand, are protected from being directly targeted “unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.”133??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
civilians who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit their protected status under international humani-
tarian law while they directly participate in hostilities. 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????134 it is generally ac-
cepted that direct participation in hostilities requires an act that is likely to result in a harm to the 
adversary;135???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
129  See 2 id. at 206-07 (1935).
130  Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8). 
131  Id. Combatants include members of  the armed forces of  a state as well as “militia and volunteer corps who 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) To carry  arms openly; and (3) To conduct their operations in accord 
with the laws and customs of  war.” Convention between the United States and other Powers respecting the Laws and 
Customs of  War, Annex § 1, ch. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 6 U.T.S. 3516; see also, HCJ 769/02 Public Committee 
Against Torture v. Israel [2005] (Isr.) at ¶ 24 [hereinafter Targeted Killing Case]. 
132  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135.
133  AP I at art. 51 (3); AP II at art. 13 (3); see also ICRC, Volume I, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 6 
(2005).
134  Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-01-42-A, ¶ 173, 175 (Int’l Trib. For the Prosecution of  Person Responsible for Serious 
Violations of  Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terr. of  the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 July 17 2008) http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/acjug/en/ 080717.pdf. 
135  See id. at ¶178. But see Schmitt, Deconstructing the Interpretive Guidance at 727 (arguing that acts that confer a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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close causal connection between an act and a harm to render the actor to be directly participating 
in hostilities.136  Instead, acts are assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Similarly, there is no precise or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????137
Instead, there is wide agreement over the extreme cases and vigorous debate over the close ones.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
enemy armed forces is directly participating in hostilities.  Additionally, there is agreement that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tilities.138  But there is less agreement as to whether a civilian driving a truck loaded with munitions 
for delivery to the front line is directly participating in hostilities.  Likewise, there is wide agreement 
that “a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his ‘home,’ and within in 
the framework of  his role in that organization he commits a chain of  hostilities, with short periods 
of  rest between them, loses his immunity from attack . . . .”139
Anwar al-Aulaqi was not a combatant.  He was not a member of  any state’s regular armed 
????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conduct their operations in accord with the laws and customs of  war.140
There is likewise little doubt that Anwar al-Aulaqi was directly participating in hostilities—and, 
therefore, a legitimate target.  Although al-Aulaqi was perhaps best known for his accessible, col-
loquial English-language calls for jihad, the United States argues—and open-source reporting sug-
gests—that al-Aulaqi was not a mere agent provocateur but also an operational leader of  AQAP.141  The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
in hostilities: 
[P]lanning at the operational level entails decisions about the conduct of  particular 
military campaigns or operations, whereas tactical planning encompasses individual 
battles or engagements. All tactical level planning, such as mission planning for aerial 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
136  Targeted Killing Case at ¶ 34.
137  Id. at ¶ 39.
138  Id. at ¶ 37 (“In our opinion, the ‘direct’ character of  the part taken should not be narrowed merely to the person 
committing the physical act of  attack. Those who have sent him, as well, take ‘a direct part’. The same goes for the 
person who decided upon the act, and the person who planned it. It is not to be said about them that they are taking an 
indirect part in the hostilities.”); see also Michael N. Schmitt, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS OR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 543 (2005).
139  Targeted Killing Case ¶ 39. 
140  Cf. Targeted Killing Case  ¶ 40 (stating that even if  members of  AQAP were subject to a responsible command, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
141  See, e.g., Alex Kingsbury, Hunting Down Anwar al-Awlaki, Public Enemy No. 1, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 
22, 2010, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/11/22/hunting-down-anwar-al-awlaki-public-enemy-no-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
role that focuses on external operations plotting.’”). 
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not occur but for that planning.142
Moreover, as an operational leader, al-Aulaqi has made AQAP his “‘home’” and, in so doing, he has 
made himself  continuously targetable.143  Were he merely a propagandist, al-Aulaqi would not have 
been a legitimate target no matter how vile his message.144
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????Inspire
magazine does not amount to direct participation in hostilities.  However, al-Aulaqi’s role as a leader 
of  AQAP, responsible for that organization’s recent emphasis on attacking the United States and the 
recruitment of  attackers like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,145 does amount to direct participation in 
hostilities.  By directly participating in hostilities, al-Aulaqi lost the protection accorded civilians and 
was subject to the use of  force.  Therefore, the United States’ targeting of  al-Aulaqi was lawful to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
III. SELF-DEFENSE
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
generally—on the basis of  self-defense.146  International law imbues states with an inherent right of  
self-defense,147 which provides states with the right to use force as a response to a particular wrong-
ful use of  force by another state148 or a non-state actor.149  A state may rely on self-defense to justify 
142 Schmitt, HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 138, at 543.
143 Targeted Killing Case ¶ 39 (Dec. 11, 2005). Cf. Int’l Comm. of  the Red Cross (ICRC), Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of  Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 1007-
09 (2008) (establishing that membership in an organized armed group, based on assumption of  a continuous combat 
function, renders an erstwhile civilian continuously targetable) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretative Guidance]; Michael N. 
Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of  Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 
5, 16-25 (2010) (criticizing the ICRC’s “continuous combat function” criteria on numerous grounds but agreeing that 
members of  an organized armed group should be continuously targetable).
144 See Strugar, IT-01-42-A ¶ 177 (“Examples of  indirect participation include . . . expressing sympathy for the cause 
?? ??????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????See also ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 
143 at 1006 (“???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
segments of  the civilian population, such as political and humanitarian wings. The term organized armed group, 
however, refers exclusively to the armed or military wing of  a non-State party: its armed forces in a functional sense.”).
145 Abdulmuttalab: Cleric Told Me to Bomb Jet, CBS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2010/02/04/national/main6174780.shtml.
146 See Memorandum in Support of  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 
(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010); Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of  State, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of  the 
American Society of  International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25,  2010) available at:
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.; see also Harold Koh, The Lawfulness of  the U.S. Operation Against 
Osama bin Laden, OPINIO JURIS (May 19, 2011) http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-
against-osama-bin-laden/.
147 See, e.g.???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
as a matter of  customary international law, predates the Charter. 
148 D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-13 (1958).
149  Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of  Self-Defense, 29 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 127, 145 (2008).
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?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ?
some debate, a state may invoke self-defense in anticipation of  an imminent armed attack. 
The classical parameters of  self-defense are famously described in an exchange of  diplomatic 
notes between the United States and United Kingdom in the Caroline incident.150  The Caroline in-
cident elucidated the three limiting requirements of  lawful self-defense: necessity, proportionality, 
and immediacy.151  The victim state’s use of  force must be necessary to disrupt the harmful attack it 
faces.  The victim state’s use of  force must be proportional to the harm it faces.  The victim state’s 
use of  force must either anticipate an imminent armed attack or immediately follow that attack.  
These three factors combine to differentiate self-defense, a fundamentally responsive and preventa-
tive action, from armed reprisal, a responsive but fundamentally punitive action.  Notably, all three 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Under customary international law, anticipatory self-defense—the resort to force to stymie an 
impending attack—was presumed to be valid.152?? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????? ?????
right to self-defense called into question the validity of  anticipatory self-defense. Article 51 of  the 
U.N. Charter declares that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of  . . . 
self-defence if  an armed attack occurs against a Member of  the United Nations.”153
The inclusion of  the “armed attack” predicate for the invocation of  self-defense in the U.N. 
Charter has led some scholars to argue that self-defense is only valid after an armed attack.154  The 
better view, though, is that Article 51 embraces the customary practice of  self-defense in anticipation 
150  Maj. Jason S. Wrachfordhe, The 2006 Israeli Invasion of  Lebanon: Aggression, Self-Defense, or a Reprisal Gone Bad?, 60 
A.F. L. Rev. 29, 53 (2007). The Caroline incident took place during the Mackenzie Rebellion in Canada.  Citizens on 
the US side of  the Niagara River who sympathized with the Canadian rebels ferried supplies to the rebels using the 
steamship Caroline.  After the United Kingdom’s diplomatic protests failed to stop the provision of  supplies to the rebels, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Caroline, killing and wounding American 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????
show a necessity of  self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of  means and no moment of  
deliberation. It will be for [Britain] to show, also . . .  supposing the necessity of  the moment authorized 
them to enter the territories of  The United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the 
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ????????? ???????????????????????
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
use, has become the standard employed by customary international law. 
151  E.g., Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note 149 (“The three universally accepted criteria of  self-defense appear in 
the [Caroline incident exchange].”).
152  BOWETT, supra note 148, at 184.
153  U.N. Charter art. 51.
154  See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275–78 (1963) (rebutting six key 
arguments in favor of  an interpretation allowing anticipatory self-defense). See also STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–101 (1996) (discussing a jurist’s summary of  arguments 
for and against an interpretation permitting anticipatory self-defense).
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of  an imminent armed attack.155  To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result of  compelling 
a state to suffer an armed attack of  which the state had notice and the ability to disrupt—the very 
essence of  self-defense.156
Though the International Court of  Justice has explicitly refused to consider the lawfulness 
of  anticipatory self-defense,157 state practice since the adoption of  the U.N. Charter indicates that 
self-defense in anticipation of  an imminent armed attack is lawful.158  The anticipatory Israeli strike 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
self-defense.  In that case, Egypt requested the U.N. force deployed in the Sinai as a buffer between 
Egypt and Israel to withdraw.  At the same time, Syrian troops accumulated on the Syria-Israel 
155 See BOWETT, supra note 148 at 184–89 (declaring that a State’s right to anticipatory self-defense is well-established 
under general international law and remains unchanged under Article 51 because the Charter did not explicitly alter 
that right); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of  Western States Towards Legal Aspects of  the Use of  Force, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442–44 (Anthony Cassese, ed., 1986) (suggesting that reading Article 
51 to preclude anticipatory self-defense creates an internal inconsistency between Article 2(4) and Article 51); see also
Antonio Cassese, Return of  Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of  the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 505, 508–20 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) (asserting that the most likely interpretation 
is that preemptive strikes are lawful against imminent threats because the Superpowers would not have been willing to 
surrender that right).
156 See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV.
933, 942–44 (1987) (“Even if  the Security Council functioned as an effective mechanism for the enforcement of  
collective security, it would be unrealistic to expect a state faced with an imminent armed attack to wait for that attack to 
be launched before resorting to force in self-defense.”).
157 See Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 222 (Dec. 19) 
(“As was the case also in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America) 
case, ‘reliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of  self-defence in the case of  an armed attack which has already 
occurred, and the issue of  the lawfulness of  a response to the imminent threat of  armed attack has not been raised’ 
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 103, para. 194) . . . . ‘[A]ccordingly [the Court] expresses no view on that issue.’”) [hereinafter 
Congo v. Uganda]. The Court determined that there had been no armed attack attributable to the Democratic Republic 
of  the Congo. Id. The Court did not consider the criteria of  self-defense beyond the armed attack predicate. See id.
158 See, e.g., BOWETT, supra note 148, at 189 (noting that only India objected to Pakistan’s invasion of  Kashmir 
despite no predicate armed attack); Higgins, supra note 153, at 443 (noting that the Security Council supported Israel’s 
preemptive strike when Egypt mobilized troops and airplanes in 1967 but condemned Israel’s attack on an Iraqi nuclear 
facility in 1981); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 192 (justifying Israel’s strike against Egypt in 1967 because “when 
all of  the measures taken by Egypt (especially the peremptory ejection of  the United Nations Emergency Force from 
the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula; the closure of  the Straits of  Tiran; the unprecedented build-up of  Egyptian 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
aggregate, it seemed to be crystal-clear that Egypt was bent on an armed attack, and the sole question was not whether 
war would materialize but when.”); Cassese, supra note 155, at 512 (mentioning asserted claims of  anticipatory self-
defense by Israel, the U.S., the U.K., and the former USSR); Greenwood, supra note 156, at 943; High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Rep. of  the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Nov. 17, 2004) (“The language of  [Article 51] is restrictive . . . [h]
owever, a threatened State . . . can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All: Rep. of  the Secretary-General, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (“Imminent threats are 
fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of  sovereign States to defend themselves against armed 
attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.”).
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border.  In light of  these circumstances, the June 5, 1967, Israeli strike against the Egyptian air force 
was viewed as a lawful use of  anticipatory self-defense: the strike was necessary; the threat posed by 
Egypt and Syria was immediate; and Israel’s initial strike—attacking the Egyptian air force to deprive 
Egypt of  air cover—was proportionate to the threat it faced. 
In contrast, the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 was widely condemned 
for failing to satisfy the criteria of  self-defense.159  In that case, the threat to Israel was speculative 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constructing a weapon, let alone commencing an armed attack with that hypothetical weapon.  Simi-
larly, the U.S. invasion of  Iraq in 2003 failed to satisfy the criteria governing self-defense.160  Thus, 
anticipatory self-defense is lawful in the face of  an imminent armed attack but the mere threat of  
force will not justify self-defense.161
The armed attack predicate of  Article 51 has also given rise to a debate over what level of  force 
????????????????????????????162  In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
???? ? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
weapons of  mass destruction change the imminence calculus for self-defense—in its 2002 National Security Strategy:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can 
lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of  attack. 
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of  preemption on the existence 
of  an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of  armies, navies, and air forces preparing 
to attack. 
We must adapt the concept of  imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of  today’s adversaries. 
Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks 
would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of  terror and, potentially, the use of  weapons of  mass destruction—
weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.
. . . 
???? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of  inaction—and the more compelling 
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if  uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of  the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if  necessary, act preemptively. 
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use 
preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of  civilization openly and 
actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while 
dangers gather.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002). 
160  See Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of  Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 602–03 (2003) 
(emphasizing the United States’ inability to articulate an imminent threat or make a strong enough case to win the 
support of  the Security Council for anticipatory action).
161  See DINSTEIN, supra note 158, at 182–83 (concluding that the Bush Doctrine—the asserted right to use force 
against mere threats—is not lawful under Article 51).
162  See ALEXANDROV, supra note 154, at 115–16 (determining that, for purposes of  Article 51, an armed attack should 
???????????????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
small-scale acts of  armed force”).
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Nicaragua, the International Court of  Justice impliedly adopted the notion that there is a threshold 
between the mere use of  force and that level of  force rising to an armed attack.  There, the Court 
stated that it saw
no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of  armed attacks may apply 
to the sending by a State of  armed bands to the territory of  another State, if  such an 
operation, ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.163
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????164  An 
attack like that attempted on Christmas Day 2009 could have resulted in the destruction of  at least a 
civilian airliner and the deaths of  nearly 200 civilians.165  As such, continued attacks by al-Aulaqi and 
AQAP against U.S. aircraft constitute armed attacks against the United States.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a targeted kill list.166????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????-
erally.167  The United States claims that “there are . . . legal bases under . . . international law for the 
President to authorize the use of  force against al-Qaeda and AQAP, including the inherent right to 
self-defense.”168  This statement is uncontroversial, so far as it goes.  Self-defense is an inherent right 
of  states under international law and self-defense does justify otherwise unlawful uses of  force.  The 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????-
ments of  necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.  Those three requirements are addressed in turn.
163  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 93 (June 27) (emphasis 
added).
164 See, e.g., TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND
PRACTICE 204–12 (2010) (reasoning that civilian aircraft and merchant vessels are “‘external manifestations’ of  the 
State”); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of  “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of  the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J.
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
armed attack). But see Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
589, 596 (1989) (“To qualify as an armed attack, international law requires that terrorist acts form part of  a consistent 
pattern of  violent terrorist action rather than just being isolated or sporadic attacks”). However, even if  one were to 
accept Cassese’s requirement that a series of  attacks take place before they constitute an armed attack, at this point 
AQAP attacks and attempted attacks against the United States likely rise to the level of  Cassese’s interpretation of  
“armed attack.”
165 Cf. Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note at 149 (interpreting Hezbollah’s cross-border rocket attacks against 
civilians as armed attacks).
166  Mem. in Supp. of  Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 9, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010). 
167  Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of  State, International Law and the Obama Administration, Keynote 
Address Before the American Society of  International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
168  Mem. 4-5, 8-9, 24, Al-Aulaqi, No. 10-1469.
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A. Necessity
Under self-defense, necessity means that the “measures taken . . . must never be exces-
sive or go beyond what is strictly required for the protection of  the substantive rights which are 
endangered.”169  Practically, this means that the state must be compelled to use force to disrupt an 
ongoing or impending armed attack because no other effective means of  redress are available.170  In 
the Nicaragua??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??????
of  Nicaraguan waters in part as a self-defense response to Nicaragua’s arming of  anti-Salvadorian 
rebels.  The International Court of  Justice (ICJ) found this invocation of  self-defense unavailing 
because the U.S. actions in question had taken place months after the anti-Salvadorian offensive 
had been commenced and repulsed.171  Thus, armed force was unnecessary to repulse or prevent an 
attack already defeated.  Similarly, the international community rejected Israel’s invocation of  self-
defense to justify its bombing of  Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility.  There, the absence of  an actual or 
? ?????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
defeat a merely hypothetical armed attack.172
In contrast, the Israeli invasion of  Lebanon in 1982 was at least initially necessary in the face of  
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) freedom of  action in Lebanon and attacks against Israel.
The Lebanese government’s inability or unwillingness to restrain PLO attacks on Israel is particularly 
important when considering whether Israeli action was lawful self-defense.173  Notably, Israel tar-
geted the PLO and not the Lebanese armed forces during its invasion.174
In the case of  Anwar al-Aulaqi and AQAP, it may well be that the use of  force against al-Aulaqi 
disrupted an impending armed attack.  However, whether that use of  force was necessary turns on 
whether other non-forceful actions were available to disrupt that attack—including whether the 
State of  Yemen was willing and able to take action against al-Aulaqi and AQAP.  In this regard, it 
is to be noted that Yemen is actively pursuing AQAP175 and was also pursuing Anwar al-Aulaqi.176
169 BOWETT, supra note 148, at 269. See also Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note 149, at 151 (“[N]ecessity requires the 
absence of  adequate non-forceful options to deter or defeat the armed attack in question. . . . [N]ecessity requires that 
???????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
170 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA L. REV 933, 
945 (1987) (“The question is whether [other means short of  armed force] would have been as effective as an air strike in 
preventing the imminent terrorist onslaught.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 158, at 209-210 (“Utopia must ascertain that there 
exists a necessity to rely on force—in response to the armed attack—because no realistic alternative means of  redress is 
available. In other words, ‘force should not be considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting or 
when they clearly would be futile.’”); Schmitt, “Change Direction,” supra note 149, at 151.
171 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 122.
172 See Thomas Mallison, Aggression or Self-Defense in Lebanon in 1982?, 77 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 174, 177-80 (1983).
173 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 209-10 (2006).
174 Id. at 247-248. But see Mallison, supra note 172, at 177-80 (questioning Israel’s self-defense claim on the basis that 
there was no actual or imminent armed attack).
175  Patrick Martin, Yemen on Offensive Against al-Qaeda Group, GLOBE AND MAIL (LONDON), Nov. 2, 2010; Mohammed 
Jamjoom, ????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????, CNN, Sept. 21, 2010; 
176  Mohammed Hatem, Yemen Militant Cleric Al-Awlaki’s Arrest Ordered by State Security Court, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 6, 
2010.
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Moreover, the United States was cooperating with Yemen, providing it military, intelligence, and 
logistical support, and even carrying out air strikes in coordination with Yemen.177
However, “necessity . . . does not require naivety.”178  As such, the examination of  the neces-
??????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ????????????????
against to counter AQAP and capture or kill al-Aulaqi.179  While Yemen is not a failed state, it is a 
failing state.180  Its government is weak and currently confronting not only AQAP in southern Ye-
men but also a tribal rebellion in northern Yemen181 and a separate secessionist movement in the 
south.  Additionally, since January 2011, the Yemeni government, like many autocratic governments 
in the region, has faced a broad-based and growing popular uprising that has inspired tribal factions 
to defect from the Saleh regime, further weakening the state.182  These multifaceted challenges call 
into question Yemen’s ability to effectively pursue AQAP and Anwar al-Aulaqi—in stark contrast to 
its highly effective post-September 11 campaign against al-Qaeda proper.183
Importantly, the United States claims self-defense in relation to Anwar al-Aulaqi individually and 
not simply AQAP.  Invoking self-defense to justify the use of  force against Anwar al-Aulaqi himself  
required that he was personally responsible for an actual ongoing or imminent armed attack.  Yet, if  
neither threats nor even use of  force short of  an armed attack will justify self-defense, it seems that 
mere calls for jihad similarly fails to satisfy the armed attack predicate of  self-defense—regardless 
of  the accessibility or inspirational quality of  those calls for jihad.  That said, al-Aulaqi’s history of  
planning actual attacks against the United States—like the Christmas Day bombing attempt or the 
printer cartridge bombing attack—makes it likely that al-Aulaqi was continuing to plot attacks on 
the United States at his death.  If  such a plot had advanced to the point of  becoming an imminent 
armed attack on September 30, 2011, then use of  force against al-Aulaqi in self-defense was appro-
177  U.S. Airstrikes on Al Qaeda in Yemen, CBSNEWS.COM, (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-
5997532.html (stating the airstrikes carried out by the U.S. were conducted at the request of  Yemen).; see also Wikileaks 
Cable Corroborates Evidence of  US Airstrikes in Yemen, AMNESTY INT’L, (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-
and-updates/wikileaks-cable-corroborates-evidence-us-airstrikes-yemen-2010-12-01 (examining the various ways the U.S. 
has collaborated with Yemen).
178  Schmitt, supra note 149, at 152.
179  Id. at 151-152.
180  The Failed States Index 2010, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_
failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (analyzing a range of  factors to determine whether a state is a failed 
state or is in danger of  becoming a failed state) (last accessed Nov. 11, 2011).
181  See, e.g., Joost R. Hiltermann, Disorder on the Border, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
national army and the impact on an already weak Yemen).
182  Laura Kasinof, Yemeni Forces Heighten Deadly Assault on Protesters in City Central to Uprising, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2011).
183  See, e.g., Gregory D. Johnsen, AQAP in Yemen and the Christmas Day Terrorist Attack, CTC SENTINEL SPECIAL REPORT,
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cooperated quite closely, even working together to kill the then head of  al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi, in an 
unmanned CIA drone strike in November 2002. Yemeni forces arrested his replacement, Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, a 
year later. The successive losses of  two key leaders as well as numerous other arrests effectively crippled the organization 
in Yemen.”). 
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priate—so long as the drone strike was both necessary and proportionate.
B. Proportionality
For use of  force to be lawful under self-defense, that force must be proportionate. In the con-
text of  self-defense, proportionality demands that the force used be no more than required to deter 
or disrupt an impending attack.184  Disproportionate use of  force invalidates an otherwise lawful 
invocation of  self-defense. 
In the case of  self-defense against non-state actors, Dinstein provides a useful discussion of  
proportionality:
[W]hen Utopia sends an expeditionary force into Arcadia, the operation is to be direct-
ed exclusively against the armed bands or terrorists, and it must not be confused with 
defensive armed reprisals. Surely, no forcible action may be taken against the Arcadian 
civilian population. Furthermore, even the Arcadian armed forces and installations 
ought not to be harmed.185
It is clear from Dinstein’s discussion that a state’s use of  force in self-defense against attacks 
by a non-state actor must be directed at that non-state actor, leaving the host state free from harm, 
for the use of  force to be considered proportionate.186  Thus, in the Congo case the ICJ noted, “The 
Court cannot fail to observe . . . that the taking of  airports and towns many hundreds of  kilometers 
from Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of  transborder attacks [Uganda] 
claimed had given rise to the right of  self-defence . . . .”187  Similarly, in the Oil Platforms case, the 
ICJ remarked that, had the Iranian anti-ship attack originated from the oil platforms attacked by the 
United States, the United States’ use of  force may have been proportionate.188  The United States’ 
destruction of  an anti-ship missile position would have been a reasonable level of  force to coun-
ter anti-ship attacks.189  However, the United States did not satisfy the proportionality requirement 
of  self-defense because it was not reasonably calibrated to deter or defeat an attack; it used force 
against oil platforms from which no attack could be linked (or proven).190
 It is clear that any force used against Anwar al-Aulaqi or AQAP under the rubric of  self-de-
fense must be tied to an imminent armed attack for which either al-Aulaqi or AQAP is responsible.  
The level of  force lawfully permitted is no more than that which is required to disrupt the impend-
184 Schmitt, supra note 149, at 153.
185 DINSTEIN, supra note 173, at 250. 
186 See also Schmitt, supra note 149, at 155 (discussing Israel’s targeting of  Lebanese infrastructure in relation to the 
2006 Summer War against Hezbollah). 
187  Armed Activities on the Territory of  the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 223 (Dec. 19).
188  Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198 (Nov. 6) (holding that the attack on Iranian oil platforms by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conditions required for an attack in self-defense, its attack on the oil platforms was not proportionate). 
189 See id.
190 Id.
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ing attack.  Additionally, it is clear that the force must be directed against al-Aulaqi or AQAP and not 
the State of  Yemen, its civilian population, its infrastructure, or its security services.  
C. Immediacy
??????????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?? ???????????????????
refers to the closeness in time of  a wrongful act and the responsive use of  force.  When force is 
used in self-defense in anticipation of  an armed attack, immediacy requires that the wrongful act be 
imminent.191  When self-defense occurs in response to an armed attack, there must not be an undue 
lag in time between the wrongful act and the corresponding use of  force.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????????
requirement, though, demands that there be a clear temporal relationship between a state’s use of  
force and a particular ongoing or imminent armed attack.  Like the other parameters of  self-defense, 
immediacy is a limiting principle. 
It may well be that when the United States launched a drone strike targeting al-Aulaqi on Sep-
tember 30, 2011, it reasonably believed that al-Aulaqi was responsible for an imminent armed attack.  
It is of  no consequence that such an attack failed to materialize, but only that one was believed to be 
imminent.
More troubling, however, is the apparent continuous targeting of  al-Aulaqi due to his presence 
on the CIA’s targeted kill list.192  On its face, such continuous targetability seems to violate self-
defense’s fundamental principle relating a particular use of  force to a particular armed attack and 
not merely the desire or hope of  a state or armed group to launch an attack in the future.  Some 208 
days passed between al-Aulaqi’s addition to the CIA’s targeted kill list and the next publicly known 
attempted AQAP attack on the United States.  It is possible that AQAP and al-Aulaqi were on the 
verge of  an imminent armed attack against the United States each of  those intervening 208 days.  It 
is also possible, however, that during some of  those 208 days al-Aulaqi and AQAP lay dormant, that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
carried out the attempted attack.  During at least some of  this period, neither al-Aulaqi nor AQAP 
would have been lawful targets under self-defense because the attack would not have been immi-
nent.193
One answer to the apparent immediacy problem may be that al-Aulaqi and AQAP were avowed 
threats to the United States—even if  they only carried out attacks sporadically.  They have targeted 
191 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States Air Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 
945 (1987) (“It would not be enough, therefore, that the United States anticipated further attacks by Libya at some 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Council, the air strike against Libya must have been a response to a threat of  terrorist attacks against the United States 
which could reasonably have been described as imminent by [the date of  the U.S. air strike on Libya].”).
192 See Mazzetti, supra note 1.
193 Compare, for instance, the Israeli airstrike on Egypt in 1967 with the Israeli airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear 
reactor in 1981. See U.N. S.C. Meeting Notes of  Security Council, ¶¶ 55, 59, U.N. Doc. S/2280 (June 12, 1981), available 
at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/100/21/pdf/NL810021.pdf?OpenElement
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the United States previously, they inspire others to target the United States, and al-Aulaqi provided 
????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
access to resources may give it the ability to launch attacks on targets of  opportunity. For those rea-
sons, AQAP and al-Aulaqi continuously presented immediate threats to the United States, justifying 
their targeting under self-defense. 
Yet, consider Israel’s airstrike on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and the Israeli strike 
against the Egyptian air force in 1967.  In 1981, Iraq was an avowed enemy of  Israel.194  Iraq had 
repeatedly threatened Israel.195  Iraqi army units had even fought against Israel in 1948, 1967, and 
1973.  Despite Iraq’s threatening posture towards Israel, the international community rejected Israel’s 
invocation of  self-defense to justify its airstrike,196 subjecting Israel to a unanimous Security Resolu-
tion condemning its action.197  Israel’s 1981 invocation of  anticipatory self-defense failed because 
Iraq was a mere threat—even assuming it possessed the will and desire to use a nuclear weapon 
against Israel, it lacked the means to do so.  It could not be argued that Iraq was on the verge of  
launching an armed attack against Israel—at least not with a nuclear weapon manufactured at the 
then-incomplete Osirak nuclear facility.  
In contrast, Israel’s strike against the Egyptian air force in 1967 is a paradigmatic example of  
anticipatory self-defense.  In that case—as in the case of  Iraq in 1981—Egypt was an avowed threat 
to Israel.  Egypt had repeatedly threatened Israel and Egypt and Israel had already fought two wars.  
However, unlike with Iraq in 1981, in 1967 Israel reasonably believed that Egypt was on the verge 
of  launching an armed attack against it.  The difference in proximity of  the anticipated attack is the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????-
tion of  self-defense in 1981.198  This difference in outcomes between 1967 and 1981 suggests that 
even a dedicated, continuous threat will not justify self-defense in the absence of  an imminent or 
194  See id. (Indeed, following Israel’s attack on Osirak, Yehuda Blum, Israel’s Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations described Iraq as “one of  Israel’s most implacable enemies.”).
195  See, e.g., ???????? ?????????????? ?????? ?????????Iraq Threatens Israel With Use of  Nerve Gas: Mideast: Leader denies 
nuclear capability but says he would destroy ‘half ’ his adversary if  attacked, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 3, 1990) http://articles.
latimes.com/1990-04-03/news/mn-702_1_gas-attack. In fact, Israel also claimed to be in a continuous state of  war with 
Iraq.
196  Cf. ?????????? ??????????????????? ?????????The Israeli Aerial Attack of  June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: 
Aggression or Self-Defense, 15 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 417, 429-31 (1982) (noting that expert testimony and French and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??
regarding Iraq’s technological progress and nuclear posture were “erroneous or misleading”). 
197  See S.C. Res. 487, ¶ 3, U.N.Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981) (“Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear 
violation of  the Charter of  the United Nations and the norms of  international conduct.”).
198  See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of  Western States Towards Legal Aspects of  the Use of  Force, in ANTONIO CASSESE,
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ongoing armed attack. 
Thus, while al-Aulaqi and AQAP may continuously threaten the United States, their continuous 
desire to harm the United States alone does not satisfy the immediacy requirement of  self-defense—
and does not justify their continuous targeting as self-defense.  Instead, al-Aulaqi (or AQAP) could 
only be attacked by the United States on the basis of  self-defense when he (or it) was responsible 
for an ongoing or imminent armed attack against the United States.  Notably, though this analysis 
suggests that self-defense is an inappropriate basis for any targeted killing program in which a listed 
individual is continuously subject to use of  force, the actual use of  force on a particular day may still 
be lawful.  That is, it may be that the drone strike on September 30, 2011, against al-Aulaqi was law-
ful self-defense, but that a similar hypothetical strike on September 1, 2011, or March 1, 2011, would 
not have been. 
CONCLUSION
That al-Aulaqi was a threat to the United States is beyond argument.  He recruited and encour-
aged individuals to take part in jihad against the United States.  He was directly involved in the plan-
ning of  operations directed against the United States.  However, the utility of  killing al-Aulaqi is not 
?????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
more than a mere threat—he must have been responsible for an ongoing or imminent armed attack 
against the United States.  And use of  force as self-defense must have been responsive to that armed 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
targeted killing program in which targets, once selected, are continuously subject to the use of  force.
Instead, in the case of  al-Aulaqi at least, the United States is better served by relying on inter-
national humanitarian law and al-Aulaqi’s conduct as an operational leader of  AQAP to justify his 
killing.  As such a leader, al-Aulaqi has forfeited his protected status by directly participating in hos-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
pated in hostilities—something he appeared to have been doing continuously until his death. 
